In my recent piece, “Where My Heart Goes: Remembering 9/11 in A World Gone Mad“, I discussed the horror of the recent school shooting that took place at the Annunciation Catholic Church School in Windom, Minneapolis, MN on August 27, 2025.

That school shooting left two kids dead…Harper Moyski, age 10, and Fletcher Merkel, age 8.

Since writing the piece above, another school shooting took place on September 11, 2025 at Evergreen High School in Evergreen, CO, wounding two students with the shooter ultimately slaying himself.

The horror of these events has led me to release this original piece…From the Vault.

I wrote this research paper 7 years ago on August 18, 2018. I wrote it for my GOVT 245 class taught by Dr. Charity Kewish at Regent University, in pursuance of my Bachelor’s Degree in Political Communications.

This piece was inspired by my own experiences…

In February of 2018, I was teaching a Homeschool Co-op class. After the February 14, 2018 Parkland School Shooting, the Administrators decided to do an active shooter training conducted by a pair of local Sheriff’ Deputy, one of whom was friends with one of the Homeschool moms.

This wasn’t just a lecture on the dangers of school shooting…this was hands-on live training, with the Sheriff’s Deputies roleplaying as the shooters with blanks in their guns, coming for us in the classrooms that we taught our students in every week.

I enjoyed this training so much and felt it was so vital, I ultimately repeated in 3 times with friends and family who also either taught or attended at the Homeschool Co-Op.

However, I knew the training could be improved upon…and so I wrote this piece as a get-up and go action plan to roll out to all the Nation.

The Plan is based on the Village Self-Defense Forces model that was used in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. This model gave guns to and tactical training to village locals to be able to defend themselves from the insurgent foe. 

This model was wildly successful, and when it was canned, we lost the wars.  

We can’t afford to lose another war…especially one in our schools at home. 

So without further ado, I give you…

SCHOOL SELF-DEFENSE FORCES: BRINGING SAFETY TO OUR SCHOOLS

By Richard Barrett

2018, AD

Columbine. 

Sandy Hook. 

Parkland. 

These names conjure up images of blood and terror in the minds of all Americans. 

They conjure up a world where kids become killers, where children are not safe, and institutions of education are not safe places of learning, but places of destruction and death. 

Even after these horrific events, schools still remain “gun-free zones” that make them a magnet for craven killers. 

America does not want another Columbine, Sandy Hook, or Parkland. 

They want their kids safe. 

It is because of this reality that  this paper proposes the creation of School Self-Defense Forces (SSDF), units of volunteer armed teachers with law enforcement-level tactical training. 

These units will coordinate with school resource officers to provide covert security to school children.

This paper will look at the problems of police response time to school shootings, historical precedent for local self-defense forces, and will present a detailed training plan for teachers in SSDF

THE PROBLEM WITH POLICE RESPONSE TIME 

As was widely reported during the Parkland Florida school shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School, police response time to an active shooter can take a very long time. 

There are a number of reasons this was a fact. 

The old model for dealing with Active Shooters was not for Police to enter the school upon arrival, but instead to set up a perimeter so the shooter could not escape the premises. 

This was the model used by the police at Columbine in 1999. It was widely criticized, and many police departments abandoned it, instead opting for Law Enforcement first responders to engage the active shooter immediately upon arrival before waiting to set up a perimeter.[1] 

At Parkland, however, school resource officer Broward County Sheriff’s Deputy Scot Peterson ordered first responders to stay 500 feet away from the building after he had pinpointed the gunman’s location. 

Broward County Sheriff’s deputy who responded to the scene likewise took cover at Deputy Peterson’s request.[2] 

Meanwhile, Coral Springs Police Department officers who arrived went into the buildings immediately to search for the gunman. 

It has been reported that Coral Springs Police Department officers had received up-to-date active shooter training the year before, and were prepared for the event. 

Broward County Sheriff’s Department deputies had not received active shooter training since 2016, some only since 2015. They had allowed their skills to rust, and in a crisis, reverted back to the old Columbine Model.[3] 

This gap in training was not the only failure of Law Enforcement to respond in a timely and effective manner. 

While Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School was located within the Broward County Sheriff’s Department’s jurisdiction, its 911 calls were routed through the Coral Springs Police Department dispatch. 

Broward County Sheriff’s Department and Coral Springs Police Department had poor inter-department communication, and this prevented the sharing of critical intelligence coming from students calling 911 in real time. 

In addition to this, Broward County Sheriff’s Department deputies had problems communicating with each other, as their department’s radio frequence was overloaded. All of this allowed the active shooter to continue his killing spree.[4] 

These issues highlighted by the Parkland shooting demonstrate that even with a nation-wide commitment to improved training, some Law Enforce departments fall short of meeting the standard. 

These failures are revealed in the moment of crisis, and the price for these shortcomings are paid in blood. 

PRECEDENT IN HISTORY 

These failures in training and response time pose a problem: if police cannot arrive to stop an active shooter in a coordinated and timely manner, what can undefended targets like schools do to keep their kids safe? 

Villages in Iraq and Afghanistan faced this same problem during the Global War on Terror. 

Locals in these countries did not want to submit to the totalitarian regimes of Al Qaeda and the Taliban. 

However, U.S. forces were often located far away from villages on sprawling Forward Operating Bases and distant Combat Outposts. National Iraqi and Afghan military and police units often faced the same distance from the villages. 

That meant that terrorists could enter into the villages without anyone to stop them, enslaving and exterminating at whim.[5] [6] 

To solve this problem. American and host-nation partner forces developed the idea of local self-defense forces. 

In Iraq, it was called “The Sons of Anbar” program.[7] [8] In Afghanistan, it was called the “Afghan Local Police” program.[9] [10]

These programs gave guns and training to villagers to provide security for themselves. That way, they could protect themselves from the terrorists immediately, without waiting on the long response time for U.S. or host-nation partner force. 

In Iraq, this program threw Al Qaeda out of the al-Anbar province..once an unassailable Al Qaeda fortress. Where it has been tried in Afghanistan, it has been wildly successful.[11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16]  

American schools face the same challenges as villages in Iraq, and Afghanistan. 

They’re full of average people of all ages, who want to live free from the fear of sadistic killers. 

They also face the same slow response time of far-away security forces. Our friends in Iraq and Afghanistan all found a way to solve this problem:

Local self-defense forces. 

THE PLAN

What would a plan look like for School Self-Defense Forces in America?

SSDF units would be composed of teachers, all volunteers. 

They would have to pass a psychological background check, and then would coordinate with the school resource officer for physical fitness, firearms, and tactical training. 

Physical Fitness would be composed of running, strength training, and breath control. 

Because so many Americans today are physically deconditioned, Physical Fitness training would start at extremely basic levels, assuming no one has mastered basic biomechanical fundamentals.[17]  

For physical fitness, SSDF volunteers would follow the protocols found in peak performance coaches’ Eric Orton, Dr. Kelly Starrett, and Pavel Tsatsouline’s books.[18] [19] [20] [21]  

Strength training would be facilitated only be registered registered instructors of Tsatsouline’s StrongFirst foundation.[22] 

For firearms training, SSDF volunteers would be taught by school resource officers. This would involve basic familiarization with firearms from hand-guns to AR-15s. 

Once familiar, SSDF volunteers would follow tactical training protocols found in Special Agent Ronald J. Adams, et al’s book Street Survival: Tactics for Armed Encounters. 

This would emphasize the ability to fire a weapon from both hands, and the tactical use of cover in a building.[23]

Within this tactical training, SSDF volunteers would assess their classrooms for optimal tactical set-up. 

For example, if a teacher’s desk is situated so that it is facing the classroom door, the desk would be moved so that it would be diagonal from the door. In this way, the teacher is not the first person in the active shooter’s immediate line of sight upon entry. 

If he is in the active shooter’s immediate line of sight, he will be the first person to be killed. This will leave the classroom defenseless. 

Instead, if he is in a diagonal position out of the shooter’s immediate line of sight, the teacher can draw his weapon and incapacitate the shooter before being seen. 

CONCLUSION  

America has lost too many innocents to the depravity of school shooters. 

The time has come for an answer that will keep America’s kids safe. 

America’s friends and allies all around the world have faced the same problem…how to protect the innocent when security forces are far-away. 

The answer is local self-defense forces…average people with extraordinary training who are already on the spot when the shooting starts. 

Local self-defense forces saved Iraq and Afghanistan. 

The SSDF can save our schools. 

Sincerely,

Richard Barrett

09-13-2025

Recreated here at 1:33 PM, somewhere in the USA…

Sources Cited 

Image 1.

[1] Banda, P. Solomon. “10 Years Later, Columbine Has Led to a Tactical Overhaul.” www.washingtonpost.com. April 19, 2009. Accessed August 18, 2018. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/18/AR2009041802277.html?noredirect=on. 

[2] Nehemas, Nicholas. “Deputies Who Took Cover at Parkland Massacre Lacked Recent Active Shooter Training.” www.miamiherald.com. May 9, 2018. Accessed August 16, 2018. https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/broward/article210619994.html. 

[3] Ibid. 

[4]  Nehamas, Nicholas; Vassolo, Martin; Smiley, David; Herrera Chabeli; and Laporta, James. “Seconds Mattered: How BSO’s Response at Parkland Went Wrong in 11 Minutes.” www.miamiherald.com. April 30, 2018. Accessed August 16, 2018. https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/broward/article209887469.html. 

[5] Boot, Max. Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2013), 515-550.

[6] Moyar, Mark. A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009) 191-258.

[7] Ardolino, Bill. Fallujah Awakens: Marines, Sheiks, and the Battle Against Al Qaeda (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013) 7-218. 

[8] Al-Anbar Awakening: Volume II, Iraqi Perspectives: From Insurgency to Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009, ed. by Montgomery, Colonel Gary W.; McWilliams, Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2009), 1-245.

[9] Moyar, Mark. “Village Stability Operations and the Afghan Local Police.” Joint Special Operations University Report, 14. no. 4 (October 2014): xi-86. https://www.socom.mil/JSOU/JSOUPublications/JSOU14-7_Moyar_VSO_FINAL.pdf. 

[10] Huslander, Robert; Spivey, Jake. “Village Stability Operations and the Afghan Local Police.” Prism: From the Field,  3, no. 3: 125-138. 

[11] Boot, Max. Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2013), 515-550.

[12] Moyar, Mark. A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 191-258.

[13] Ardolino, Bill. Fallujah Awakens: Marines, Sheiks, and the Battle Against Al Qaeda (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013), 7-218.

[14] Al-Anbar Awakening: Volume II, Iraqi Perspectives: From Insurgency to Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009, ed. by Montgomery, Colonel Gary W.; McWilliams, Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2009), 1-245.

[15]  Moyar, Mark. “Village Stability Operations and the Afghan Local Police.” Joint Special Operations University Report, 14. no. 4 (October 2014): xi-86. https://www.socom.mil/JSOU/JSOUPublications/JSOU14-7_Moyar_VSO_FINAL.pdf. 

[16] Huslander, Robert; Spivey, Jake. “Village Stability Operations and the Afghan Local Police.” Prism: From the Field,  3, no. 3: 125-138. 

[17] “The Scientific Rationale for Integrated Training.” NASM Essential Personal Fitness Training. ed. by Clark, Michael A.; et al.  (Burlington, MA: Jones & Bartlett Learning, 2018), 2-16.

[18]  Orton, Eric. The Cool Impossible: The Coach From Born to Run Shows How to get the Most from your Miles–and from Yourself (New York: Penguin Group, 2013).

[19] Starrett, Dr. Kelly; Cordoza Glen. Becoming a Supple Leopard: The Ultimate Guide to Resolving Pain, Preventing Injury, and Optimizing Athletic Performance (Las Vegas: Victory Belt Publishing, 2015).

[20] Tsatsouline, Pavel. The Naked Warrior: Master the Secrets of the Super-Strong–Using Bodyweight Exercises Only (St. Paul, MN: Dragon Door Publications, Inc., 2011).

[21] See also Wade, Paul. Convict Conditioning: How to Bust Free of All Weakness–Using the Lost Secrets of Supreme Survival Strength (St. Paul, MN: Dragon Door Publications, 2009) and Tsatsouline, Pavel. Hardstyle Abs: Hit Hard, Lift Heavy, Look the Part (St. Paul, MN: Dragon Door Publications, Inc., 2012).

[22] “Instructors: Strongfirst Instructors.” www.strongfirst.com. Accessed August 17, 2018. https://www.strongfirst.com/about/instructors/. 

[23] Adams, Special Agent Ronald J.; McTernan, Lieutenant Thomas M.; Remsburg, Charles. Street Survival: Tactics for Surviving an Armed Encounter (Northbrook, Illinois: Calibre Press, 1980).

Bibliography

Adams, Special Agent Ronald J.; McTernan, Lieutenant Thomas M.; Remsburg, Charles. Street Survival: Tactics for Surviving an Armed Encounter (Northbrook, Illinois: Calibre Press, 1980).

Al-Anbar Awakening: Volume II, Iraqi Perspectives: From Insurgency to Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009, ed. by Montgomery, Colonel Gary W.; McWilliams, Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2009).

Ardolino, Bill. Fallujah Awakens: Marines, Sheiks, and the Battle Against Al Qaeda (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013).

Banda, P. Solomon. “10 Years Later, Columbine Has Led to a Tactical Overhaul.” www.washingtonpost.com. April 19, 2009. Accessed August 18, 2018. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/18/AR2009041802277.html?noredirect=on. 

Boot, Max. Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2013).

Huslander, Robert; Spivey, Jake. “Village Stability Operations and the Afghan Local Police.” Prism: From the Field,  3, no. 3: 125-138.

 “Instructors: Strongfirst Instructors.” www.strongfirst.com. Accessed August 17, 2018. https://www.strongfirst.com/about/instructors/. 

Moyar, Mark. A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).

–.“Village Stability Operations and the Afghan Local Police.” Joint Special Operations University Report, 14. no. 4 (October 2014): xi-86. https://www.socom.mil/JSOU/JSOUPublications/JSOU14-7_Moyar_VSO_FINAL.pdf.

Nehemas, Nicholas. “Deputies Who Took Cover at Parkland Massacre Lacked Recent Active Shooter Training.” www.miamiherald.com. May 9, 2018. Accessed August 16, 2018. https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/broward/article210619994.html. 

–; Vassolo, Martin; Smiley, David; Herrera Chabeli; and Laporta, James. “Seconds Mattered: How BSO’s Response at Parkland Went Wrong in 11 Minutes.” www.miamiherald.com. April 30, 2018. Accessed August 16, 2018. https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/broward/article209887469.html. 

Orton, Eric. The Cool Impossible: The Coach From Born to Run Shows How to get the Most from your Miles–and from Yourself (New York: Penguin Group, 2013).

Starrett, Dr. Kelly; Cordoza Glen. Becoming a Supple Leopard: The Ultimate Guide to Resolving Pain, Preventing Injury, and Optimizing Athletic Performance (Las Vegas: Victory Belt Publishing, 2015).

“The Scientific Rationale for Integrated Training.” NASM Essential Personal Fitness Training. ed. by Clark, Michael A.; et al.  (Burlington, MA: Jones & Bartlett Learning, 2018), 2-16.

Tsatsouline, Pavel. Hardstyle Abs: Hit Hard, Lift Heavy, Look the Part (St. Paul, MN: Dragon Door Publications, Inc., 2012).

–.  The Naked Warrior: Master the Secrets of the Super-Strong–Using Bodyweight Exercises Only (St. Paul, MN: Dragon Door Publications, Inc., 2011).

Wade, Paul. Convict Conditioning: How to Bust Free of All Weakness–Using the Lost Secrets of Supreme Survival Strength (St. Paul, MN: Dragon Door Publications, 2009).